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CASE NOTE

Torts-DEFAATION-PRVATE CITIZENS NEED ONLY SHOW NEGLIGENCE IN DEFAMATION ACTIONS AGAINST MEDIA DEFENDANTS. DOES
THIS STIFLE THE MEDIA AT THE PUBLIC'S EXPENSE?-Miami Her-

ald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984)
Some degree of abuse is inseparablefrom the properuse of every
thing; and in no instance is this more true than in that of the
press. It has accordingly been decided, by the practice of the
states, that it is better to leave a few of its noxious branches to
their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to injure
the vigor of those yielding the proper fruits.
-James

Madison1

I. INTRODUCTION
In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane,2 the Florida Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the Third District Court of Appeals and held that "it is sufficient that a private plaintiff prove
negligence" to establish a defamation claim against a media defendant.4 The court further determined that an actual injury to reputation is not a prerequisite to the recovery of compensatory damages."The supreme court's decision in Ane comes ten years after
the United States Supreme Court, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,6
issued a qualified invitation to the states to fashion their own standard of liability with respect to defamation actions brought by private citizens. By adopting a negligence standard, the Florida Supreme Court receded from a policy providing a qualified news
1. 4 J. FLIr DEBATES ON THE ADOTON OF TE Fum.L CONSrumioN 571 (2d ed. Philadelphia 1836). Ironically, the Third District Court of Appeal in Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376, 387 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), afl'd, 458 So. 2d 239 (Fla.1984) incorrectly attributed this quotation to Thomas Jefferson, illustrating that even appellate judges,
who have more time to consider their opinions than reporters have to prepare their articles,
can make good faith errors of identification.
2.

458 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984).

3. Ane, 423 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
4. Ane, 458 So. 2d at 242.
,5. Id. at 242-43.
6.

418 U.S. 323 (1974). The Court in Gertz announced that "so long as they do not

impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private
individual." Id. at 347.
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reporters' privilege for the protection of the dissemination of news
to the public. The court's new, broader standard of liability imposed upon publishers, coupled with a more expansive treatment
of damages, may lead to media self-censorship.
This Note analyzes the decisions of the Third District Court of
Appeal and the Florida Supreme Court to illustrate the difficulties
which the new standard of negligence creates for media defendants. The Note also examines the conflicting arguments supporting the divergent standards of actual malice 7 and negligence. Finally, the Note proposes legislation that would attempt to
reconcile the competing interests between first amendment guarantees and the rights of private citizens to protect their reputational
interests.

II. A

MATTER LEFT TO THE STATES

Prior to 1964, 8 the law of defamation was governed by the common law of the individual states.9 The early view was that the defamer was strictly liable unless he could prove that the words were
true or privileged.10 If the language could be construed as defama7. Two standards of malice will be discussed; actual malice and common law express
malice. Although different, both standards afford greater protection than the negligence
standard adopted in Ane. See infra notes 149-75 and accompanying text.
8. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). This was the first in a series of
Supreme Court decisions which would substantially alter states' rights to apply common law
principles of strict liability in defamation actions. See infra notes 15-17 and accompanying
text.
9. Defamation, including libel and slander, has been defined by Florida courts as "the
unpriviledged publication of false statements which naturally and proximately result in injury to another." Wolfson v. Kirk, 273 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). See RESTATEmENr (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977), which states, "A communication is defamatory if it
tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him" The elements needed
for a cause of action in defamation are:
(A) A false and defamatory statement concerning another;
(B) An unprivileged publication to a third party;,
(C) Fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and
(D) Either actionability of the statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of
special harm caused by the publication.
Id. § 558.
Historically, defamation received no constitutional protection because of a belief that it
had minimal social value. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 482 (1957) (10
of the 14 states ratifying the Constitution included guarantees of free expression in their
state constitutions; 13 of these states had provisions for prosecuting libel); Chaplihski v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (the social benefits derived through the prevention and punishment of obscenity, libel, and fighting words outweighed any benefits that
such speech provided).
10. See RESTATBmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 578 (1977); W. PROSSER & W. KEON, THE
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tory, the defendant was liable without regard to any wrongful intent, recklessness, or negligence.11 This notion of strict liability was
applicable both to private defendants and the media.1 2 This harsh
rule emerged from a fear of the media's power to damage those
whom it disfavored.1 3 Florida's common law, however, has revealed
an extreme
sensitivity toward free speech and an unfettered
14
press.
The United States Supreme Court, in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,"5 decided to take defamation matters into its own hands
to protect the guarantees of the first amendment.1 6 In a unanimous
LAW OF TORTS §§ 111-116A, at 771-848 (5th ed. 1984); Note, Developments in the
Law-Defamation, 69 HAnv. L Rav. 875, 938-45 (1956).
11. McCellan v. L'Engle, 77 So. 270, 272 (Fla. 1917).
12. Defamation includes libel (printed word) or slander (spoken word). The expression
"defamation per se" characterizes a publication that is defamatory on its face and injurious
without proof. See Piplack v. Mueller, 121 So. 459 (Fla. 1929). Moreover, damages were
presumed, and consequently did not have to be pled or proved. But see Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (Court abolished presumed damages regarding media
defendants); Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 431 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
The court in Boyles noted, "While Gertz has abolished one distinction between libel per se
and libel per quod in an action by a private individual against the media-the presumption
of damage-it has not abolished the distinction in regard to innuendo. Therefore, it has not
abolished the tort of libel per se." Id. at 633. For a list of categories of defamation per se
and an exhaustive list of cases dealing with the different categories, see Rahdert & Snyder,
Rediscovering Florida'sCommon Law Defenses To Libel and Slander, 11 STmSON L. REv.
1, 4-7 (1981).
Defamation per quod is that publication where the defamatory nature of the material is
not apparent on its face. The defamatory nature must be shown through extrinsic facts or
innuendo and must be pled and proved. Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 236 (Fla. 1933).
Special damages must also be pled and proved. See generally Prosser, More Libel Per Quod,
79 HARv. L Rav. 1629 (1966).
13. Layne, 146 So. at 239.
14. Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend's Adm'x, 21 Fa. 431 (1885). The court asserted:
[If] fairly made by a person in the discharge of some public or private duty,
whether legal or moral, or in the conduct of his own affairs, [or] in matters where
his interest is concerned ... [or]... [if] fairly warranted by any reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, ... communications are protected for the
common convenience and welfare of society, and the law has not restricted the
right to make them within any named limits.
Id. at 456 (quoting Toogood v. Spyring, 149 Eng. Rep. 1044 (Ex. D. 1834)) (emphasis omitted). See also Montgomery v. Knox, 3 So. 211 (Fla. 1887) (court restricted a privilege to
show malice to inhouse insurance publication); Layne, 146 So. 234 (court extended a qualified privilege to newspapers of general circulation).
15. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The case arose from a newspaper advertisement that alleged
numerous civil rights violations by the Montgomery, Alabama police force. The Alabama
Supreme Court affirmed a $500,000 judgment against the New York Times. The United
States Supreme Court reversed.
16. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-

162

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:159

decision, the Supreme Court announced that state law may not
constitutionally permit a public official to recover damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct, unless he
proves with "convincing clarity" that the statement was made
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not"; or in the legal vernacular, "actual
malice. ' 17 The objective of the New York Times rule, created to
provide wide latitude for journalistic error, was to diminish the
threat of libel judgments and thereby reduce the incentive for the
media to self-censor its coverage of important events."8 As the actual malice standard' developed, 9 it expanded to apply to publications about public figures20 and to matters of public concern. In
1971, the Supreme Court established the high watermark of constitutional protection in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc..21 In Rosenbloom, the Court held that in all matters of public or general concern, public and private individuals must show with convincing
clarity that the defendant publisher acted with actual malice in
ances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.

17. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Supreme Court later expanded the definition of public officials by stating that "the 'public official' designation applies at the very
least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the
public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
18. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1966); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279;
see also Rahdert & Snyder, supra note 12, at 12-14 (1981).
19. Actual malice was the term created to designate the standard of fault to govern constitutionally protected defamatory falsehoods. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80. "Express malice" is defined as ill will, hostility or intent to injure and defame. Montgomery, 3
So. at 217. See infra notes 168-175 and accompanying text.
The term "reckless disregard," connoting actual malice, was refined in St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) where the the Court explained that reckless disregard did
not refer to whether a reasonable man would have published the article without further
investigation. Instead, the Court focused on whether the particular defendant "entertained
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731.
20. See Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). A magazine article accused a
retired Army general of leading a racial riot at the University of Mississippi. The Court
determined that the plaintiff had thrust himself into a public controversy and, therefore,
was a "public figure." Id. at 154-55. Because of his status, he was required to show actual
malice. See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Butts was a companion
case to Walker, which involved a magazine article accusing the plaintiff, a well known football coach, of fixing a football game. The Court concluded that the plaintiff had attained the
status of a public figure by virtue of his position. Id. at 155. Thus, the classification of public
figure developed into two categories. One included those individuals who thrust themselves
into the center of an important controversy. The other category represented those individuals who provided a continuing interest to the public.
21. 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom involved a news broadcast of plaintiff's arrest for
possession of obscene literature. The stories used the terms "smut literature racket" and
"girlie-book peddlers."
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order to recover damages. 2 21 Only three years later, however, the
Court retreated from this position when it announced, in Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,23 that "so long as they do not impose liability
without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual."2'
In the years following the Gertz decision, Florida courts were left
in a quandary as to the standard of liability applicable to media
defendants in defamation actions brought by private individuals.
Absent a clear decision by the Florida Supreme Court, the circuit
and district courts applied their.own standards based on divergent
interpretations of controlling Florida law. 28 The case of Miami
22. The Court aptly asserted:
If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become
less so merely because, a private individual is involved, or because in some sense
the individual did not "voluntarily" choose to become involved. The public's primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of the participant
and the content, effect, and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior
anonymity or notoriety.
Id. at 43.
Although the Rosenbloom decision was a plurality opinion and not binding on the states,
the Third District Court of Appeal was persuaded by the "public concern" rationale in
Nigro v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 262 So. 2d 698 (FIa. 3d DCA), cert. denied, 267 So.
2d 834 (Fla. 1972). In that case, newspaper articles described a group as "Cosa Nostra members and their associates" and as "henchman of midwestern Mafia leaders." Although the
plaintiffs claimed that the articles were false and defamatory, the Third District affirmed
the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Miami Herald.Significantly, the court
determined that organized crime was a matter of public concern. Id. at 699-700.
23. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz involved an attorney who represented the family of a boy
who was shot and killed by a policeman in a civil action against the policeman. An article
was published by the defendant magazine stating that the trial was part of a national conspiracy to discredit local law enforcement agencies in order to create a communist regime.
The article portrayed Elmer Gertz as a "Communist-fronter" and a "Leninist." No effort
was made to verify or substantiate the charges, all of which contained inaccuracies. The
district court, anticipating the Supreme Court's decision in Rosenbloom, set aside the jury
verdict for the attorney and granted the defendant magazine publisher's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 322 F. Supp. 997, 999-1000
(NJ). 1MI1970), aff'd, 471 F.2d 80 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
24. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
25. Karp v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (applying a
negligence standard); Finkel v. Sun Tattler Co., 348 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977) (not
determining which standard applied), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 1978); Helton v.
United Press Int'l, 303 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) (not determining a standard).
26. For instance, the court in Karp applied a negligence standard based on an erroneous
reading of Firestone v. Time, Inc., 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972) [hereinafter cited as Firestone
I], rev'd on other grounds per curiam, 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Firestone II], vacated, 424 U.S. 448 (1976). In From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d 52
(Fla. 1st DCA 1981), the court noted that the Supreme Court's Firestonedecision did not
mandate a negligence standard. Id. at 56.
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Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane 21 provided an opportunity for the
supreme court to clearly articulate a standard which would ameliorate the conflict between the free dissemination of news and the
protection of private reputational interests.
A.

Facts of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane.

On Monday, November 21, 1977, Monroe County Sheriff's deputies discovered and seized three tons of marijuana from an Old
Milwaukee beer truck in the Florida Keys.2 s In preparation for a
news article about the incident, Greg Kirstein, a reporter for the
Miami Herald, made several attempts to obtain the identity of the
truck's owner. 29 His efforts included a telephone call to the company that formerly leased the truck. He also checked with the
state agency responsible for automobile registration. Additionally,
Kirstein called the Dade County officials responsible for issuing
auto licenses and made repeated contacts with the sheriff's office.
Notwithstanding these efforts, Kirstein was unable to positively
identify the truck's owner. His search did, however, uncover four
possible owners of the truck, one of whom was Aurelio Ane, a local
beer distributor.3 0 Officials of the sheriff's office had informed Kirstein that the truck was registered to Lillian Fernandez. 31 However, subsequent inquiry revealed a possibility that Ane had recently purchased the truck.ss Kirstein learned of Ane's identity
from Marvin Kimmel, the president of the company that formerly
leased the truck.83 The law enforcement officials told Kirstein that
Ane was not a suspect in the case. Ane was out of town and could
not be reached to verify Kimmel's statement regarding the ownership of the truck. Kirstein's article, published on November 22,
1977 in the Miami Herald, read in pertinent part:
TRUCK ADVERTISED BEER: CARRIED MARIJUANA
BALES An 'Old Milwaukee' beer truck, sold only last Thursday
by a Miami firm to a Key West distributor was confiscated early
Monday carrying about three tons of baled marijuana on U.S. 1 in
Marathon, Monroe County Sheriffs officials said .
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

458 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984).
Ane, 423 So. 2d at 378-79.
Id. at 379.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Kimmel told Kirstein that the truck had been purchased on the prior Thursday

for $2,750 cash.
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THE LARGE red-and-white truck, which Monday contained
bales either wrapped in burlap or packaged in cartons from Colombia, had been purchased Thursday by Aurelio Ane, Key West
Distributors Inc. president, according to Marvin Kimmel, president of Miami's Universal Brands Inc."
Additionally, the Herald reporter listed three others as possible
owners of the truck and identified the sources of the information. 5
The following day, after the police investigation was completed,
the Herald published the correct name of the owner and renounced any involvement on the part of the other named

individuals.8 5
Ane brought a libel action against Marvin Kimmel and the
Miami Herald. In circuit court, the judge denied motions by the
defendants for summary judgment and motions by all parties for a

directed verdict.8 7 The jury was instructed that "the plaintiff could

recover in his libel action if the greater weight of the evidence

showed that the defendants negligently published the false and defamatory statements sued upon."3 8 Consequently, the jury awarded,
$5,000 in compensatory damages against the Herald and $10,000 in
compensatory damages against Marvin Kimmel.
On appeal, Chief Judge Hubbart, writing for the majority of the

Third District Court of Appeal, affirmed the judgment of the circuit court and held that a negligence standard applies to private
individuals in an action for libel. The court reasoned, "[I]n our
view, a showing of New York Times 'actual malice' is never re34. Id. at 378-79. The court took issue with the lead paragraph of the article which attributed the naming of an unidentified beer distributor to a sheriff's official. Id. Three
paragraphs into the article, however, Ane's name was first mentioned with the proper attribution. Id. Under Florida law, an article alleged to be defamatory must be taken as a whole
and its statements read in their proper context. Valentine v. CBS, 698 F.2d 430, 432 (11th
Cir. 1983).
Although the court stated that no attempt was made to contact Lillian Fernandez, a portion of the article reprinted in a footnote in the opinion reads that Fernandez could not be
reached for comment. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 380 n.l.
35. 423 So. 2d at 37940. The article also stated: "ALTHOUGH KIMMEL said Ane purchased the trucks, both sheriff's officials and state Motor Vehicle Department officials said
the truck's plate was registered to another Key West resident, Lillian Fernandez, 2718 Harris Ave." The article included other possible owners as well. Id.
36. Id. at 381. After printing the name of Lillian Fernandez as the actual owner, the
article stated: "Police and a Miami beer distributor said Tuesday that Aurelio (Porky) Ane,
president of Key West Distributors, Inc., was not involved in the purchase of the truck.
They blamed earlier reports of his involvement on a 'misunderstanding'." Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 381-82.
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quired where, as here, the defamation plaintiff is a private individual and not a public official or public figure." 3 Additionally, after
reviewing the full record,' 0 the court determined that the jury was
correct in finding that the article was false and defamatory. 1
B.

The Third District's Decision

Unlike prior Florida courts faced with defamation actions
brought by private citizens, 42 the Third District Court of Appeal
directly confronted the dilemma of protection of the press versus
injury to reputation. While the court was apparently motivated by
a sincere desire to protect the private citizen from the excesses of
the media, a close examination of its opinion reveals that in reaching its desired end, the court falls short of a complete and thought39. Id. at 382. The Florida Supreme Court recently decided that under certain circumstances, an "express malice" standard is applicable to defendants in defamation cases
against private citizens. Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984). The supreme court
determined that remarks made about a teacher at a school board meeting were protected by
a qualified privilege.
40. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984). The Supreme Court
permits a review of the record in first amendment cases to ensure that the facts support the
verdict. But see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Frank, 442 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 3d DCA
1983) (court determined that its function as an appellate court precluded it from viewing
the evidence), petition for review denied, 10 Fla. L.W. 276 (Fla. May 9, 1985).
41. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 390.
42. See, e.g., From v. Tallahassee Democrat, Inc., 400 So. 2d at 58. The First District
asserted, "The article itself, a part of the complaint, can neither be actionable under a standard of actual malice or simple negligence; and without adopting either standard as the law
in Florida, we do hold, however, that the trial judge reached the proper result, and we affirm
his order." Id. at 58. The court was able to escape this quandary by observing that the
statement made in the article was based on opinion, which is protected and privileged by
the Constitution. Id. at 57.
Notably, the From court elaborated on what constituted "opinion." The court determined
that "pure opinion occurs when the defendant makes a comment or opinion based on facts
which are set forth in the article or which are otherwise known or available to the reader or
listener as a member of the public." Id. The court went on to say, "Mixed expression of
opinion occurs when an opinion or comment is made which is based upon facts regarding
the plaintiff or his conduct that have not been stated in the article or assumed to exist by
the parties to the communication." Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) op ToRTs § 566
(1977)). This is yet another complicated distinction that has served as a trap to the unwary
reporter. In Madsen v. Buie, 454 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), a letter was published in
the TallahasseeDemocratwhich attacked the teaching methods of a Florida State University professor. The court determined that it was not pure opinion and, therefore, not constitutionally protected. Id. at 729. See also Smith v. Taylor County Publishing Co., Inc., 443
So. 2d 1042, 1047 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) where the court grappled with the fact/opinion dichotomy and concluded that statements commenting on a published letter included factual
assertions that were unprotected as an opinion. But see Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803
(Fla. 1984) where the supreme court protected harsh comments made by a parent about a
teacher. Apparently, the court made the distinction because the statements were made at a
school board meeting as opposed to publication in a newspaper.
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ful analysis of Florida case law dealing with free expression.
The court initially restricted its analysis to the first amendment
and to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny.4 Misinterpreting Florida common law as establishing a strict liability
standard in defamation cases, Chief Judge Hubbart, writing for the
majority, asserted that "[a]ll of these higher standards are, however, not prerequisites of the Florida common law of defamation or
Florida constitutional law; they are prerequisites of the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution which heretofore
did not exist under Florida law."' 44 A brief examination of prior
Florida law illustrates the impropriety of such a conclusion.
Contrary to the Chief Judge's observation, the Florida judiciary
and legislature45 have historically subscribed to the notion that the
press has a special responsibility to disseminate news to its readers. In recognition of this responsibility, a qualified privilege developed under Florida common law, insulating certain communications from defamation suits. 4 In order to overcome the qualified
privilege, which was determined by the court as a matter of law, a
plaintiff had to prove "express malice"; that is, "ill will, hostility,
[or] evil intention to defame and injure." 4TThe express malice standard evolved from the early case of Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend's Administratrix, where the Florida Supreme Court first acknowledged the qualified privilege. 48 In Coogler v. Rhodes, decided
in 1897, the supreme court expressly established a qualified privilege as an affirmative defense. Once the privilege was established
by a showing that the information was of public concern, the burden to prove malice shifted back to the plaintiff.49 Subsequently, in
43.

Ane, 423 So. 2d at 382-83. See supra notes 15-24 and accompanying text.

44. 423 So. 2d at 383.
45. 1933 Fi. Laws, ch. 16-070, §§ 1-2 (current version at FL . STAT. §§ 770.01-.02
(1983)).
46. See Rahdert & Snyder, supra note 12, at 32-33; Note, Defamation, The PrivateIn-

dividual And Matters Of Public Concern: A Proposed Resolution ForFlorida,32 U. FL. L
Rav. 545 (1980) (author traces the origins of the common law qualified privilege).
47. Montgomery v. Knox,3 So. 211, 217 (Fla. 1887).

48.

21 Fla. 431, 449-50 (1885). The Jones court reasoned, " "The rule of evidence as to

[the qualified privilege] is accordingly changed so as to impose it on the plaintiff to remove
those presumptions flowing from the seeming obligations and situation of the parties, and to

require of him to bring to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his
conduct."' Id. (quoting White v. Nichols, 44 U.S. (3 Howard) 266, 291 (1845)).
49.

21 So. 109 (Fla.1897). In Coogler, the court opined that publications could contain

false statements and still retain a qualified privilege. Coogler involved a defamatory letter
from the defendant to the governor. The plaintiff had been appointed by the governor to
the office of sheriff, but had not yet taken office. The defendant wrote to the governor accus.ing the plaintiff of running a house of ill-repute. The plaintiff, Rhodes, sued, asserting that
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Layne v. Tribune Co., the supreme court extended the qualified
privilege to publications reporting incidents of public interest." In
Layne, the court spoke extensively about the need for new defamation doctrines to deal with the complexities of the modern media.5 1
Overlooking the qualified privilege in its reading of Florida law,
the Third District Court of Appeal interpreted the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. as mandating a negligence standard in defamation actions brought by private individuals.8 2 In actuality, the Supreme Court in Gertz tolerated negligence as the minimum standard of liability in private
defamation suits against media defendants.5 3 Indeed, the Supreme
Court afforded "substantial latitude" to the states in the creation
of their own standards of liability. 4 Consequently, in its failure to
consider Florida's long history of providing a qualified privilege to
report matters of public concern, the district court subverted the
foundation upon which Florida's protection of the free press had
been predicated.5 5
the letter was false and malicious. The defendant lost, but the supreme court reversed and
remanded. The court rationalized, "Communications to the appointing power with reference
to the character and qualifications of candidates for public office have been often given as
illustrations of qualifiedly or conditionally privileged publications." Id. at 112. The court
held that "no action will lie for false statements in the publication unless it be shown that
they are both false and malicious, and the burden of proof in this respect rests upon the
plaintiff." Id.
50. Layne, 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933).
51. Id. at 237-39.
52. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 384.
53. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347.
54. Id. at 345.
55. Continuing its trend of broad media protection, the Florida Supreme Court in 1947
extended the qualified privilege to newsworthy items. Cooper v. Miami Herald Publishing
Co., 31 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1947) involved a local newspaper which published an account of a
shooting, supposedly at the plaintiff's restaurant. Contrary to the article, the shooting took
place a short distance from the restaurant Affirming a judgment for the newspaper, the
court recognized the newspaper's responsibility of supplying vest information and broad
news coverage. The court concluded that because the article "simply refiect[ed] an incident
of public interest," appellant's failure to prove malice was fatal. Id. at 384. Likewise, in
Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941 (5th Cir. 1948), the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals acknowledged Florida's position and reversed an excessive verdict for the
plaintiff. In Caidwell, an article charged the Governor of Florida with indifference to lynchings in the state. The court noted that the Layne decision stood for the proposition that
public interests are better served by an extension, rather than a restriction, of the media's
qualified privilege to publish matters affecting the interest of the general public. Id. at 943.
Subsequently, the Florida Supreme Court, in Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (FIa 1950),
again reiterated its commitment to a free press. Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
asserted that "[tihe public has an interest in the free dissemination of news." The court
recognized the special and difficult task of gathering and reporting the news and that occasional errors are inevitable. The court reasoned that "since the preservation of our American
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The Third District supported its adoption of a negligence standard by postulating that in Firestone v. Time, Inc.,"6 the Florida
Supreme Court had implicitly adopted a negligence standard for
cases concerning private figures in libel actions. This reliance was
misplaced, however, because the court in Firestone determined
that the issue of the Firestone divorce was not one of public concern and, therefore, was not entitled to the protection of the actual
malice standard.5 7 Finding the story unprotected, the supreme
court incorrectly applied a strict liability standard and was reversed by the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
held that there must be some showing of fault when dealing with a
media defendant.58 After determining that the matter was not one
of public concern, there was no need for the Florida Supreme
Court to grapple with the public-private dichotomy.5 9 Significantly,
the focus of the supreme court's analysis was on the subject matter
of the news rather than the status of the parties involved.
In Ane, Chief Judge Hubbart cited Gibson v. Maloney0 and
Abram v. Odham1 for the proposition that a qualified privilege exists to publish a "fair comment" or a "fair account" of a public
matter involving a public figure. 2 He distinguished these cases by
asserting that "[t]he great majority of American courts hold that
no comment can be fair if it is based on misstatements of fact." 5 A
careful look at prior Florida case law reveals that this assertion is
inaccurate. For example, in Coogler v. Rhodes, the Florida Supreme Court recognized that communications could contain false
statements and yet be protected by a qualified privilege." The
Third District in Ane skirted this holding by stating that the court
in Coogler neither "adopts [n]or even discusses a Rosenbloom
rule." 65 Although the Coogler court did not use the term "actual
democracy depends upon the public's receiving information speedily-particularly upon get-

ting news of pending matters while there still is time for public opinion to form and be
felt-it is vital that no unreasonable restraints be placed upon the working news reporter or
the editorial writer." Id.
56.

271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972).

57.

Id. at 752.

58.
59.

Firestone, 424 U.S. at 464.
See Note, supra note 46, at 567 n.133.

60. 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 1970).
61. 89 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1956).
62. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 385.
63. Id. (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Brautigam, 127 So. 2d 718, 723 (Fla. 3d

DCA 1961)).
64. 21 So. 109, 112 (Fla. 1897); accord Ross v. Gore, 48 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1950).
65. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 385.
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'
malice,""
as set forth in the Rosenbloom decision which was decided seventy-four years later, the district court did hold that with
respect to candidates seeking public office, "no action will lie for
false statements in the publication unless it be shown that they are
both false and malicious, and the burden of proof in this respect
rests upon the plaintiff.""7
The district court in Ane never directly acknowledged the standard of express malice already in existence in Florida common law.
For instance, in Abram v. Odham,e " the Florida Supreme Court applied the express malice test, defining express malice as a falsehood with intent to injure.69 Stated another way, Florida's express
malice standard focused on the defendant's attitude toward the
plaintiff, while actual malice focused on the defendant's attitude
toward the truth or falsity of the material published. 0 Notwithstanding this distinction, the district court failed to recognize the
precedential significance of the protective standards invoked in
earlier Florida cases which insulated the press from the self-censorship engendered by a fear of libel. Significantly, the focal point
of the qualified privilege has generally been the subject matter of
the news, as opposed to the status of the parties involved.7 1
Although the Third District Court of Appeal devoted much of its
opinion to paying tribute to the notion of a free press in a democratic society,72 in its final analysis, the court reasoned that it
"seems neither sensible nor fair to push the parameters of the free
press and free speech to such an extent, as urged here, that we
needlessly plow under other important individual rights."7 3 Indeed,
the court made several references to the power of the press, and

66. The Florida Supreme Court has, however, used the term "actual malice" interchangeably with the term "express malice" in Jones, Varnum & Co. v. Townsend's Adm'x,
21 Fla.431 (1885). This was not the same treatment that the United States Supreme Court
gave the term in New York Times, 376 U.S. at 280. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying
text.

67. Coogler, 21 So. at 112. The court also noted with approval, "Where a person is so
situated that it becomes right, in the interest of society, that he should tell to a third person

certain facts, then, if he bonafide, and without malice, does tell them, it is privileged communication." Id. (citations omitted). Certainly a publisher has a duty in the interest of society to report the confusion over vehicles used to transport illegal drugs, as did the reporter
in Ane.
68. 89 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 1956).
69. Id. at 336.
70. Cantrell v. Forrest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251-52 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
71. See generally Note, supra note 46; Rahdert & Snyder, supra note 12.
72. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 386-87.
73. Id. at 387.
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stated that, "[i]n [its] judgment, the primary limitation against the
excesses of the power of the mass media-a power which by any
standard is considerable in this country-is the defamation action. 7 4 Using defamation suits as a means to bridle the press is
troubling insofar as it ignores prior Florida law which sanctioned
the idea that public interests are better served by an extension,
rather than a restriction, of the media's qualified privilege to publish matters of public concern. 5 In its review of the record, the
court concluded that the Miami Herald published statements that
were false and defamatory. Moreover, the court determined that
this was "a clear case of journalistic negligence, the evidence of
which in this case was more than ample to go to the jury for final
resolution. ' 7 6 Upon the facts, the court concluded that the reporter
was negligent for reporting what it characterized as "unverified,
contradicted hearsay. 7 7 However, the fallacy in the majority's conclusion is that as a practical matter, almost everything reported is
based on "hearsay" information inasmuch as reporters and publishers rarely have first-hand knowledge of all the events which
converge to create a news item. Significantly, the court did recognize, however, that the reporter made several attempts to verify
the information which ultimately led to the discovery of the identities of other possible owners of the truck whom he named in his
article. Moreover, the contradictory information was included in
the article.7 In news reporting, the kind of personal verification
advocated by Chief Judge Hubbart is impractical, if not
impossible.
Judge Pearson, in a special concurrence, supported Chief Judge
Hubbart's conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court had adopted
74. Id. at 388. Chief Judge Hubbart asserted, "Indeed, it is a basic tenet of democracy
that all power-public as well as private-must be subject to effective limitation lest the
power be abused." Id. at 388 (footnote omitted).
75. See Crowell-Collier Publishing Co. v. Caldwell, 170 F.2d 941, 943 (5th Cir. 1948).
76. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 390.
77. Id.
78. The article provided, "ALTHOUGH KIMMEL said Ane purchased the trucks, both
sheriff's officials and state Motor Vehicle Department officials said the truck's plate was

registered to another Key West resident, Lillian Fernandez, 2718 Harris Ave." Id. at 380 n.1.
The article further stated:
Adding more confusion to the case was a registration sticker pasted on the beer
truck's license plate that did not coincide with Dade County Auto Tag Division
records for that plate. A division spokeswoman said the sticker found on the beer
truck rightfully belonged on a 1964 Chevrolet pick-up truck owned by a Miami
man.
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a negligence standard in Firestone II.79 Although he never expressly took issue with any part of the majority opinion, Judge
Pearson apparently believed that the plaintiff's burden of proof, as
established in Firestone II, was one of clear and convincing evidence, rather than a preponderance of the evidence. 0 Indeed, this
would explain his desire to write an opinion which, in all other respects, merely supported Chief Judge Hubbart's analysis.
Judge Hendry, in a well-reasoned dissenting opinion, questioned
the majority's interpretation of the Firestonedecisions. He saw the
Ane case as an opportunity to clarify the Firestone cases and to
adopt a standard "requiring private individuals who bring libel actions, arising from news reports of general or public interest, to
prove that the defamatory falsehood was published with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of the truth."8 1
Reflective of the uncertainty which surrounds the area of libel
law, Judge Hendry took a strikingly different view of the Firestone
I decision and Florida's common law. Judge Hendry maintained
that before Gertz was decided, the Florida Supreme Court in Firestone I had determined that private individuals had to prove that
a reporter had acted with actual malice before recovering for defamation involving matters of public or general concern.82 He noted
the significance of the sequential order of the Firestone and Gertz
cases, and argued that since Firestone I was decided prior to
Gertz,8s the actual malice standard established in Rosenbloom remained intact. Likewise, the Florida Supreme Court in Firestone
II did not reject the Rosenbloom rule, nor did it specifically address the issue of liability involving private citizens."
79. Id. at 390-91.
80. Id. at 391.

81. Id. at 391 (Hendry, J., dissenting). Several states share Judge Hendry's view and
have adopted an actual malice standard for news reports of general or public concern in
light of Gertz. See Ryder v. Time, Inc., 3 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1170 (D.D.C. 1977); Rollenhagen v. City of Orange, 172 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); Walker v. Colorado
Springs Sun, Inc., 538 P.2d 450 (Colo.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025 (1975); Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 372 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind.Ct. App. 1978); Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321 N.E.2d 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976); Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 266 N.W.2d 693 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1978).
82. 423 So. 2d at 392 (Hendry, J., dissenting). He realized that Gertz did not compel any
standard other than a showing of fault and, therefore, Firestone I was still valid law in
Florida. Id. at 393-94.
83. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Firestone I, 271 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1972).

84. Although there was a reference to the word "negligence" in FirestoneII, 305 So. 2d
at 178, the focus of the Florida Supreme Court was still on the content of the news. Judge
Hendry, in his dissenting opinion in Ane, noted this but opined that after considering the
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Judge Hendry also recognized that Gertz merely allowed states
to formulate their own standards of liability regarding private individuals.8 5 He concluded that Firestone I was the last statement by
the Florida Supreme Court and, therefore, binding upon the
courts. 86 Accordingly, Judge Hendry
opined that the actual malice
87
standard was the law in Florida.
Focusing on Florida common law, Judge Hendry observed the
Florida Supreme Court's long tradition of insulating the press from
libel actions which would lead to self-censorship.88 He viewed the
majority's holding as a serious threat to the free flow of news-a
threat which is not justified by an occasional harm.8 9 He asserted
that "[tihe actual malice standard permits freedom of speech and
press to dominate, but not eradicate, the individual interest of reputation and privacy."90 Finally, he perceived the actual malice
standard as providing certainty to the reporter, while protecting
private and public individuals from recklessness. 91
B. The FloridaSupreme Court Adopts a Negligence Standard
Acknowledging the magnitude of its decision, the Third District
certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court as a
matter of "great public importance":
[W]hether a plaintiff [who is neither a public official nor public
figure] in a libel action is required under Florida law to establish
as an element of his cause of action that the defendant published
the alleged false and defamatory statements sued upon with 'actual malice' . . . [i.e., either with knowledge of [their] falsity or

with reckless disregard of [their] truth or falsity] when the alentire opinion, these references did not mandate a new standard of liability for private citizens. He noted that "even if Firestone II does indicate a tendency for Florida to adopt a
negligence standard, this tendency would apply to defamation suits not involving a matter
of public concern." 423 So. 2d at 393-94 n.3 (emphasis in original).
85. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 392-93.
86. Id. at 393.
87. Id. Judge Hendry noted, "What is important is that in Firestone I the Florida supreme court [sic] adopted the actual malice test for this type of libel action and has not
expressly disavowed that standard, despite the United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Gertz." Id.
88. Id. at 394.
89. Id. at 395. Judge Hendry asserted, "In my opinion, the majority's holding severely
threatens media freedom. Error by a rigorous press is inevitable, and by permitting financial
sanctions to be imposed solely for negligent errors, the majority's decision will inevitably
reduce the flow of vital information and ideas to the public." Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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leged false and defamatory statements relate to an event of public
or general concern.2
In a brief opinion, the supreme court affirmed the holding of the
Third District Court by a vote of five-to-two in favor of a negligence standard.9 3
Ironically, the Florida Supreme Court largely agreed with the arguments of the Miami Herald and Judge Hendry. Following Judge
Hendry's reasoning, and contrary to Chief Judge Hubbart's position, the supreme court recognized that a qualified privilege existed for media defendants under Florida common law, which required a showing of express malice. 4 It noted that to overcome
this privilege, the plaintiff must have shown ill will, hostility, or an
evil intention to defame and injure.9 5 Despite its acknowledgment
of a qualified privilege, the supreme court rejected express malice
as the appropriate standard, apparently troubled by what it perceived to be an attempt by the Miami Herald to expand the privilege beyond its traditional scope.9 8 The supreme court also recognized that the Gertz decision did not mandate a negligence
standard, but merely required some showing of fault.97
The supreme court, departing from Judge Hendry's analysis,
embraced the views of the majority of the district court and held
that a qualified privilege to report on matters of public concern is
applicable only to plaintiffs who are governmental officials, candidates, or other public figures.9 8 The supreme court also echoed the
Third District's belief that the negligence standard will encourage
responsible reporting and that it provides "breathing room for mistakes to occur."9 9 Like the Third District, the supreme court in
Ane independently examined the record and agreed that there was
92. Id. at 378.
93. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239. The majority consisted of Chief Justice Boyd and Justices Adkins, Overton, Alderman, and Shaw. Justices McDonald and Ehrlich dissented.
94. Id. at 240. The supreme court cited Coogler v. Rhodes, 21 So. 109 (Fla. 1897), as
establishing a standard of "express malice." See also Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803

(Fla. 1984).
95. Ane, 458 So. 2d at 240 (citing Montgomery v. Knox, 3 So. 211, 217 (Fla. 1887)).
96. Id at 242.
97. Id. at 241. Although the supreme court was cognizant that Gertz did not mandate a
negligence standard, it opted for the minimum showing of fault. The court reasoned, "The
effect of Gertz is to treat all matters of general or public interest and to reject the proposition that these matters are qualifiedly privileged." Id.
98. Id. at 242.
99. Id.
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sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict.100 The court concluded that an injury to reputation was not necessary to prove an
actual injury. Proof of mental anguish and personal humiliation
were considered sufficient to warrant recovery. 10 1
In Tribune Co. v. Levin,102 decided the same day as Ane, the
supreme court affirmed the decision of the Second District Court
of Appeal which had characterized a manufacturer of solar heating
devices as a private citizen.10 3 Without discussion and based solely
upon its decision in Ane, the supreme court affirmed the defendant
publisher's liability for articles concerning the manufacturer's business and personal activities, and found that evidence submitted on
a negligence standard was sufficient to sustain a jury verdict.,"
Justice McDonald, joined by Justice Erhlich, dissented in both
Ane and Levin. In Ane, the dissenters stated that an actual malice
standard was the more appropriate standard for media defendants
reporting events of public concern.105 Justice McDonald reasoned
that "[i]f the news media is to perform its role fearlessly and
responsibly in our free society, it should not have to defend its inadvertent and unintentional errors."106
In his dissenting opinion in Levin, Justice McDonald asserted
that "a commercial enterprise engaged in marketing and selling
goods or services to the public, for libel purposes, is on the same
footing as a public figure or public official."1 07 He reasoned that a
commercial enterprise profiting from the public does not merit the
rights afforded private individuals. 08 He found constitutional support for his conclusions in the United States Supreme Court's decision in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union.109 The Court in Bose determined that an enterprise publicly engaged in business is
analogous to a public figure and, therefore, must show actual
malice. 110
100. Id.
101. Id. at 242-43.
102. 458 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1984).
103. Tribune Co. v. Levin, 426 So. 2d 45 (FI. 2d DCA 1982).
104. Levin, 458 So. 2d at 244 (Fla. 1984).
105. Id. at 243.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 245.
108. Id. Justice McDonald asserted, "The media can and should address and report the
conduct of those concerns dealing commercially with the public." Id.
109. 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984).
110. Levin, 458 So. 2d at 245. Justice McDonald saw no difference between the commercial trade of stereo speakers and solar energy.
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C. Analysis of Ane
The decisions in Ane and Levin strongly suggest that the supreme court was predisposed to bridle what it perceived to be the
excessive power of the press. In contrast to its solicitude for the
plaintiffs in Ane and Levin, the court had no difficulty applying
the express malice standard in a subsequent defamation suit
brought by a private citizen against a nonmedia defendant. In
Nodar v. Galbreath,11 decided three months after the Ane and
Levin decisions, the supreme court held that a parent has a qualified privilege as a matter of law to utter defamatory communications about a teacher's performance at a school board meeting.1 12
The court then concluded that there was not a sufficient showing
of express malice to overcome this privilege. 1
The strong protection the supreme court was willing to afford
communications made by a nonmedia defendant at the expense of
a private citizen's 11 4 reputation may reveal that its decisions in
Ane, Levin, and Nodar reflect an ideological double standard,
treating communications made by the media differently from those
made by private citizens. The extent of this different treatment
will have to be reconciled in future decisions.11 5 In the meantime,
the threat of liability persists. Curiously, the extent of protections
of the first amendment and the common law qualified privilege are
now governed by such distinctions as the status of the speaker 1 "
111.

462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).

112. Id. at 809-10.
113. Id. at 812.
114. A good argument exists as to whether the supreme court came to the proper conclusion when it characterized a school teacher as a private citizen for purposes of a defamation
action. The Supreme Court observed in another context:
[A] teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important
influence over their perceptions and values. Thus, through both the presentation
of course materials and the example he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to influence the attitudes of students toward government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities.
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979).

115. The Florida Supreme Court in Nodar acknowledged that "past cases had recognized the privilege of comment where there were 'additional factors'." 462 So. 2d at 810 n.5.
This may indicate that the supreme court will be more receptive in other cases dealing with
matters of public or general concern if the factual situation justifies protection.
116. See, e.g., Smith v. Taylor County Publishing Co., Inc., 443 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1983). The court discussed the distinction between public and private persons but
never actually decided the classification of a publisher of a newspaper. Id. at 1048-49. The
dissenter took issue with the court's holding and stated that a publisher should be a public
figure as a matter of law. He also opined that the allegedly libelous statements were pure
opinion and, therefore, were protected. Id. at 1049-50. (Thompson, J., dissenting).
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and where the communication is published, 117 rather than the ac-

tual newsworthiness of the statements.1' "
With respect to the Ane court's finding that the statements were
both false and defamatory, noticeably absent from the analyses of
the district court and supreme court was the case of Cooper v.
Miami Herald Publishing Co."" In Cooper, the supreme court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the defendant in a
case involving a news article about criminal behavior in south Florida. The article dealt with a shooting that was reported to have
occurred at a Miami restaurant.

20

Although the shooting actually

occurred a short distance from the restaurant, the court considered
the article in its entirety and decided that the article was neither
defamatory nor malicious, "but simply reflect[ed] an incident of
public interest in the environs of the City of Miami."' 2' Inasmuch
as both the Ane and Cooper articles involved criminal activity in
south Florida, the Miami Herald's primary circulation area, it
would seem that the analysis used by the supreme court in Cooper
is applicable to the Ane case. The court's failure to distinguish
these cases provides publishers with no clear guidelines to use in
their publication decisions.
II.

RAMwIICATIONS OF

Ane

The issue of free press versus private reputation has inspired debate among legal scholars, legislators, and judges since the eighteenth century.'22 The measure of protection afforded the media
under the broad language of the first amendment has undergone
117. See, e.g., Madsen v. Buie, 454 So. 2d 727 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), where the court held
that defamatory statements about a professor in a newspaper were not privileged. Compare
Nodar, 462 So. 2d 803. (Fla.1984) where the court held that defamatory comments made

about a teacher at a school board meeting had a qualified privilege.
118. See Sussman v. Damian, 355 So. 2d 809 (FIa. 3d DCA 1977). Judge Hubbart, speaking for a unanimous panel, upheld a summary judgment in favor of an angry lawyer who
had accused another lawyer of professional misconduct. It seems hard to reconcile that an
attorney in a nonjudicial proceeding could be afforded a qualified privilege for angry words
spoken, but that a reporter performing his job in good faith can be precluded from having
the same privilege and, thus, be held accountable for his mistake. It is instructive that
judges, who are members of the legal profession, have no trouble recognizing the need for a
qualified privilege with respect to the practice of law.
119.

31 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 1947).

120. Id. at 383.
121.

Id. at 384.

122. The Third District in Ane noted that a great deal of debate existed among the
Founding Fathers regarding the public interest in the free dissemination of news versus the
importance of the defamation action as an individual's sole remedy against the occasional
excesses of the media. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 386-87.
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significant changes over the years. The emergent body of defamation law abounds with subtle distinctions that confuse even the
trained legal mind, not to mention the reporter or publisher whose
behavior it attempts to govern.
As in most constitutional issues, persuasive arguments exist on
both sides. 123 Some have argued that with the increased power of
the press comes a heightened responsibility to its audience and to
the subjects of its stories.12 4 Even the strongest advocates of the
first amendment would agree that the special role played by the
press in our society should inspire it to act responsibly. 25 Notwithstanding this desire, they acknowledge that reputational interests
must always collide with interests in free expression. Some commentators and judges believe that strong libel laws are a means to
accomplish the objectives of promoting responsible journalism and
providing a remedy for injured claimants.1 26 Justice Harlan believed that the Court's devotion to preventing self-censorship at
the expense of libel laws was unwarranted. 127 He perceived that
some self-censorship was desirable. He opined that "[i]t does no
violence. . . to the value of freedom of speech and press to impose
a duty of reasonable care upon those who would exercise these
1' 2
freedoms.
Other commentators and judges believe that a negligence stan29
dard of liability will lead to troublesome and uncertain results.1
123. For an interesting and an informative reading of opposing points of view, see generally, Robertson, Defamation and the FirstAmendment: In Praiseof Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 54 Twn L REv. 199 (1976) (advocating a restrictive standard for reporters). See also
Anderson, A Response to ProfessorRobertson: The Issue is Control of Press Power, 54 TEa.
L. REv. 271 (1976) (advocating broader protection for newsgatherers).
124. See Robertson, supra note 123, at 204-06; see also, Comment, Florida Defamation
Law and the First Amendment: Protecting the Reputational Interest of the Private Individual, 11 FLA& ST. U.L Rv. 197 (1983).
125. Professor Anderson states:
"I share Professor Robertson's distaste for some of the journalistic practices evident in these cases. As an editor, I would have serious doubts about publishing in
a national news magazine the divorces of private citizens .... But it is one thing
to state one's views as an editor or reader, and quite another to advance them as
the basis for a system of libel law.
Anderson, supra note 123, at 281.
126. Robertson, supra note 123, at 260-61. But see Shapo, Media Injuries to Personality: An Essay on Legal Regulation of Public Communication, 46 Tint L Rav. 650, 651-58
(1968).
127. Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 71-72 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 70. See Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: FirstAmendment
Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALiF. L. Rav. 935, 950 (1968).
129. Professor Anderson asserts, "I do not think libel law is an appropriate solution to
the problem of press accountability. It is too clumsy, too discriminatory, too uncertain."
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The Florida Supreme Court and proponents of a negligence standard for media defendants seem to envision a regime, however unrealistic, where a reporter's use of reasonable care will effectively
protect him from liability in libel actions brought by private individuals. However, one need look no farther than the Ane case to
conclude that a negligence standard provides no greater protection
than strict liability.13 0 The facts of Ane reveal that the reporter
received information about the ownership of the truck from the
president of the company that formerly leased the truck.131 The
reporter made several calls in attempting to verify the truck's ownership. Refusing to speculate as to the truck's true owner, he listed
four possible owners and commented on the confusion surrounding
13 2
the ownership in his article.
Despite what some reporters would consider diligent efforts, the
jury's finding of negligence comes as little surprise. The juror has
little or no experience in the practical realities of newspaper deadlines.1 33 Unlike other professions, such as medicine and law, expert
testimony on responsible publishing will not be instructive because
of the divergence of opinion surrounding the practice of journalism
held by reporters and publishers.134 Indeed, this will penalize the
more radical publications and promote conservative reporting.
More importantly, publishers have little incentive to conform to a
certain mode of behavior. They may find it more expedient to censor important but potentially defamatory information rather than
risk liability.13"Equally perplexing, appellate review of the jury's
determination will be difficult, since judges generally regard the elements of negligence as exclusively within the province of the
Anderson, supra note 123, at 283.
130. Brief of Amicus Curiae Apalachee Publishing Co. at 6, Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984).
131. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
132. The reporter wrote in the article: ""It may be that the truck's [sic] changed hands
two or three times recently. We're just starting (the investigation),' Detective Joe Valdes
said of the confusion over the truck's ownership. 'We find a lot of this in these cases."' Ane,
423 So. 2d at 380 n.1.
133. Brief of Petitioner at 39, Miami Herald v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239. Even more troubling
is the difficulty in determining what constitutes a reasonable publisher. Since the press is
considered the professional disseminator of news, presumably the defendant's conduct is to
be measured against a professional standard. Clearly, a "responsible publisher" standard
would be inappropriate since the members of the journalism profession cannot agree among
themselves as to what constitutes "responsible" conduct. See Anderson, Libel and Press
Self-Censorship, 53 Tax L REv. 422, 466 (1976).
134. See Anderson, supra note 133, at 455.
135. Id. at 432 n.56.
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jury. 13 The situation is further aggravated by the supreme court's
implicit decision to change the plaintiff's standard of proof from
"clear and convincing" to "the greater weight of the evidence."" 7
Consequently, judges and juries have been given liberty to invoke
their own uninformed notions about the practice of journalism.
Hence, the editor must base his decision on a lay person's assessment of what is reasonable for the profession.13 8 Although this situation characterizes many civil liability rules, the deterrence function of the rule is counterbalanced by the unique and intolerable
39
threat of self-censorship.1
As a practical matter, the negligence standard adopted in Ane
may be expected to change potential plaintiffs' perceptions of their
chances for success. The plaintiffs' bar, not surprisingly, will sense
the trend of media disfavor by both the judiciary and juries. De136. Id. at 457. See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Frank, 442 So. 2d 982, 983 (Fla.
3d DCA 1983). The court cited Helman v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 349 So. 2d 1187, 1189
(Fla. 1977).
137. The supreme court never expressly adopted this new burden of proof, but implicitly
did so by affirming the decision of the trial court that used this standard in its jury instructions. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 381-82. Judge Pearson's concurrence, however, leaves doubt as to
whether this matter will have to be expressly addressed in the future. Id. at 390-91.
138. See Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 580 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974). In Aafco, an Indiana appellate court recognized this dilemma when it commented, "We refuse to adopt a rule that would allow private citizens to
obtain judgments on the basis of a jury determination that a publisher probably failed to
use reasonable care. Such a rule would promote self-censorship by causing publishers 'to
steer far wider of the unlawful zone."' Id. at 588 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
526 (1958)).
139. There are those who question whether a negligence standard for private citizens will
lead to self-censorship. For instance, Justice White asserted, "To me, it is quite incredible to
suggest that threats of libel suits from private citizens are causing the press to refrain from
publishing the truth." Gertz, 418 U.S. at 390. See also Robertson, supra note 123, at 210.
Professor Robertson, like the Third District in Ane, used the Watergate expos6 as an example of journalistic aggressiveness. Insofar as the Watergate series of articles involved public
officials, the actual malice standard applied. The question is whether in the face of a lesser
standard, this intrepid style of reporting might not be extended to coverage of unions, universities, corporations, and other powerful private institutions. Professor Anderson notes
that even the most casual reader should recognize that these areas do not get equal treatment. Anderson, supra note 123, at 283 n.46; see also THE AssoctATED PAsS,Tan DANGERS
OF Lim (1964) which instructs:
There are three steps to be taken in the evaluation of a story. The first question is
whether it is libelous, that is, whether it is actionable on its face. If it is, then the
test is whether the facts stated are provably true. If the answer to the first question is in the affirmative, and you are not certain as to the second, then you must
decide whether the story is qualifiedly privileged. If the story is libelous or potentially libelous and it fails to survive the two tests mentioned, then there is only
one course of action to be followed: KILL IT AT ONCE.
Id. at 4. (emphasis in original).
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spite the "breathing room" the supreme court thought it preserved
for the press,'" publishers will undoubtedly be painfully 6ognizant
of this changed perception of potential plaintiffs. The press will
feel intimidated by the imposition of liability even in light of the
militating factual scenario of Ane, and in an inevitable increase in
the cost of libel insurance.
As an alternative to censorship or nonpublication, and in support of a negligence standard, Professor Robertson suggests that
the "publisher identify the source of the story so that the credibility of the newspaper no longer supports the truth of the statement.' 4 1 In support of this alternative, he cites the Florida case of
Layne v. Tribune Co.242 in which the supreme court absolved a
newspaper for republication of a defamatory remark. The court in
Layne described its decision as "in harmony with the theory that
under the ancient rules of the common law, one who heard a slander was not liable for repeating it, if he does so in the same words,
and at the same time gave in publishing it, his authority for the
statement made."" 3 Despite the court's analysis in Layne, the
facts of the Ane case reveal that this is not a safe alternative to
self-censorship. Closely akin to the privilege to republish the news
is the doctrine of "neutral reporting.' 4 This is founded upon the
notion that newspapers should not be liable for errors published
which are not their own." 5 The facts of Ane reveal a classic case of
140. Ane, 458 So. 2d at 242 See Anderson, supra note 133, at 452.
141. See Robertson, supra note 123, at 264.
142. 146 So. 234 (Fla. 1933).
143. Id. at 238.
144. See Edwards v. National Audubon Soc'y, Inc., 556 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1977). In Edwards, the court held that the first amendment protects disinterested reporting of statements by others involving events that are of public interest. Accord El Amin v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 9 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1079 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct 1983). The court
acknowledged the Third District's opinion in Ane, but found neither negligence nor actual
malice in this case due to the privilege to neutrally report the news. Id. at 1081-82. The
court went on to say that the "First Amendment protects the accurate and disinterested
reporting of those charges, regardless of the reporter's private views regarding their validity." Id. at 1081.
See also Hatjioannou v. Tribune Co., 8 Media L. Rap. (BNA) 2637 (Fla. 13th Cir. 1982).
The court stated, "For the neutral reportage privilege to apply, the only element necessary
beyond those required for the official action privilege is that the matter reported upon be of
public concern." Id. at 2640. Significantly, the court also asserted that the "[n]eutral reportage [privilege] is broader than official action in that it is available for news reports of privately disseminated information, as well as news reports based on official sources." Id. (emphasis in original).
145. The court in Edwards opined, '"he public interest in being fully informed about
controversies that often rage around sensitive issues demands that the press be afforded the
freedom to report such charges without assuming responsibility for them." 556 F.2d at 120.
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neutral reporting where the reporter attributed the reported information to its source. Despite his adherence to this accepted journalistic practice, the jury found the reporter negligent. 4 6 Somewhat inconsistently, the jury held the publisher of the information
liable, even though it believed that the statements were in fact
made to the Herald.1 47 In order for a jury to recognize and apply
these doctrines, comprehensive jury instructions must be given.
Even more troubling, by upholding the finding of negligence, the
Third District and the supreme court failed to adopt the Layne
48
rationale or the more modern doctrine of neutral reporting.1
A.

A Showing of Malice

The argument has been advanced that the only effective way to
deter press censorship is to grant to the media an absolute immunity from libel suits. Justices Black and Douglas long argued that
the framers of the Constitution intended that the press should be
completely unfettered and thus, not accountable for its occasional
errors.14 9 This argument stems from a belief that juries cannot
grasp the actual malice standard, and that the judiciary has failed
See also Bair v. Palm Beach Newspapers, 8 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2028 (Fla. 15th Cir. CL
1982). The facts of this case are similar to the facts in Ane. In Bair, the executive director of
a drug abuse center made statements to a reporter about the dismissal of the plaintiff. The
plaintiff conceded the statements were made and that they were accurately reported and
attributed to their source. The court determined that there was a common law qualified
privilege to report on matters of public concern. Id. at 2031. It also noted that the Rosenbloom standard of actual malice survived Firestone II and was therefore, still controlling.
Lastly, the court concluded that the doctrine of neutral reporting applied in this case
"where a news article has merely related statements made by a responsible official concerning a matter of public concern." Id. at 2032. See also Wade v. Stocks, 7 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2200 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1981).
146. Ane, 423 So. 2d at 382.
147. Id.
148. See also Karp v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 359 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978).
The court made an independent judicial determination that the reporter was not negligent
and granted the defendant publisher's motion for summary judgment.
149. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (concurring); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (concurring); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (concurring); Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board,
367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (dissenting); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961)
(dissenting); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 441 (1961) (dissenting); Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399, 422 (1961) (dissenting); Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S. 388, 392
(1960) (dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140-44 (1959) (dissenting);
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957) (dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250, 371 (1952) (dissenting); American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,
445 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting; Douglas, J., taking no part in consideration or decision of
the case); See Robertson, supra note 123, at 206-08.
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to properly apply the standard on de novo review.1 50 Although the
absolutist view has never gained the support of the majority, case

law nevertheless reveals this argument to be meritorious. 1 1 Courts
have sometimes distorted the test of actual malice to punish those
whom they believe to be irresponsible publishers. "2 The end result
is that any standard of liability is only as good as the court's application of the standard. Judicial reluctance to apply any standard

consistently and thoughtfully will render it ineffective.
The actual malice standard has also been criticized because it
generally is not utilized until the trial stage551 or beyond.1' Consequently, it does little to reduce litigation costs. In a recent decision
150. See Anderson, supra note 133, at 456.
151. For instance, in Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975), the 1968 Democratic nominee for Governor of West Virginia brought a libel action. After being tipped off by members of his opponent's campaign
staff, reporters investigated and published a series of news items implicating Sprouse's involvement in illegal land transactions. Although the court acknowledged that most of the
statements were true, it believed that the stories gave rise to inferences that he participated
in shady deals. Despite his position as a political candidate and thus, a requirement of an
actual malice standard, the jury awarded Sprouse $750,000. The court reduced the judgment
to $250,000.
After reviewing the record, the West Virginia Supreme Court justified the judgment by
asserting that the evidence indicated that the "[defendant] newspaper foreswore its role as
an impartial reporter of facts and joined with political partisans in an overall plan or
scheme to discredit the character of a political candidate." Id. at 680. Notwithstanding the
truth of the stories, the court imposed liability because it found that the articles deliberately
misled the reader with words and oversized headlines. Indeed, intent to injure Sprouse was
inferred from the story merely because the information was obtained from his political opponents. It is apparent that the court based its decision on whether to extend first amendment protection on matters of journalistic style rather than content.
152. Prior to Gertz, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to apply the actual malice
standard where the newspaper mistakenly identified the plaintiff as an alleged Peeping
Tom. Francis v. Lake Charles Am. Press, 265 So. 2d 206 (La. 1972). See also Frakt, The
Evolving Law of Defamation: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan to Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., and Beyond, 6 RuT.-CAx L J. 471, 481 (1975).
153. In Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court of
appeals rejected the use of summary judgment for media defendants. The court determined
that "convincing clarity" and independent judicial determination requirements do not apply
at the summary judgment stage. The court asserted.
Imposing the increased proof requirement at [the summary judgment] stage would
change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for a minimum of
facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an evaluation of the weight of those facts
and (it would seem) of the weight of at least the defendant's uncontroverted facts
as well.
Id. at 1570.
154. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 104 S. Ct. 1949 (1984) (allowing a de novo
review of the facts to determine whether they supported the verdict); see also Abrams, The
Supreme Court Turns New Page in Libel, 70 A.BA. J. 89 (1984). The article noted that
89% of the cases that reach the jury are decided against the defendant. On appeal, nearly
75% of these verdicts are reversed or reduced in amount.
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by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, the court restricted the use of summary judgments in libel actions.'51 Hence, the issue becomes whether the story is worth the
cost of a potential defense of a jury trial. 5 '
1.

Actual Malice

Despite these valid criticisms, application of the actual malice
standard when judging the conduct of one who reports matters of
public concern would better serve Florida's commitment to "robust
and open debate" than would a simple negligence standard. 157 The
actual malice standard serves two important objectives. First, it
holds the media accountable for intentional abuses. Second, it provides the adequate breathing space 58 necessary to prevent the
"chilling effect" of self-censorship. Notwithstanding arguments to
the contrary, this alternative does not preclude the private individual from pursuing an action in defamation where the press acts in
a reckless manner. 5 Furthermore, this approach is consistent with
the development of Florida's media law, which has focused on the
155. Anderson, 746 F.2d at 1570. The court apparently perceived this as a benefit to the
plaintiffs but, conceivably, it might cost them a great deal more. The smaller newspapers
will also feel the financial burden.
156. See Anderson, supra note 133, at 436-38 (author noted that some newspapers cannot afford the costs of litigating a libel suit); see also Robertson, supra note 123, at 260.
157. Ane, 458 So. 2d at 242.
158. It has been argued that since no one can prove the necessity of "breathing space"
for the first amendment or the necessity of redressing reputational injuries, neither deserves
greater reverence. See Robertson, supra note 123, at 210-11. In support of this proposition,
Professor Robertson cites Judge Learned Hand who aptly stated, "[The first amendment]
presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude of
tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will
be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all." United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), afl'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
159. Florida courts have not been reluctant to hold media defendants accountable for
what is perceived as recklessness. For example, in Holter v. WLCY T.V., Inc, 366 So. 2d 445
(Fla. 2d DCA 1978), the Second District set aside the trial court's directed verdict in favor
of the media. The court held that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to determine that a
television station acted with actual malice when it aired statements that a Reddington
Beach mayor resigned because he had been implicated in embezzlement and extortion. Id.
at 455-56.
See also Cape Publications, Inc. v. Adams, 336 So. 2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 943 (1977). In Cape Publications,the Fourth District held that the evidence sustained a jury finding that the defendant newspaper acted in reckless disregard of
the truth. Id. at 1200. The article dealt with alleged bribes by the building official of Vero
Beach. Notably, the record showed that the reporter had made the statement that he was
"going to get the appellee and put him in jail." Id. The court implied that there was sufficient evidence to overcome the burden of proving common law express malice as well.
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content of the speech as opposed to the status of the parties.16e
The advantages of the actual malice standard have been recognized outside the confines of the judiciary. During the Florida constitutional revision of 1978, the Ethics, Privacy and Elections Committee accepted the invitation extended in Gertz and
recommended that as a matter of state law, "[in] all defamation
actions, truth shall be a defense and, in all matters of public or
general concern, the publication shall be privileged in the absence
of actual malice".16 1 After vigorous debate, the committee's proposal was defeated.16 2 One commentator noted that "conflicts between the rights of free speech and press and the individual's interest in good reputation will be resolved by the judiciary, unaided
by political policymakers-the commission and the people". "
Notwithstanding criticism that the subject matter approach reposes too much editorial discretion in the judiciary, emphasis upon
the content of the information is still superior to emphasis upon
the plaintiff's status.1 Additionally, distinguishing between public
and private matters will provide stronger protection for all citizens
when news stories invade their private concerns. 1 5 Moreover, the
ad hoc determination of who is a public figure or official has been
applied with difficulty and inconsistency.166
160. Content of speech as opposed to the status of the parties has also been the focal
point in privacy actions. The Florida Supreme Court has announced that one emerges from
seclusion by being present at the occurrence of an event of public interest. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 36 (Fh. 1955). Subsequent to the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Jacova, the United States Supreme Court decided Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374 (1967) in a similar fashion. In Hill, a magazine reported that a current play recounted the experiences of the plaintiff's family when they were held hostage in their home
by escaped convicts. After the family brought an action under a state privacy statute, the
Court determined that because the article dealt with a matter of public concern, the privacy
interest of the individual must yield to the primary value that society places on freedom of
the press. Id. at 388. The Court concluded that a showing of actual malice would be necessary for recovery. Id. at 390. See generally Wright, Defamation,Privacy, And The Public's
Right To Know: A National Problem And A New Approach, 46 TEx. L. Rhv. 630 (1968).
161. See Dore, Of Rights Lost and Gained, 6 FLA. ST. U.L-Rv. 610, 630 n.132 (1978).
162. Id. at 632.
163. See Dore, supra note 161, at 632. Justice Overton, who was acting as commissioner,
believed that the standard of liability was a policy question. Professor Dore noted Justice
Overton's belief that this issue was "more appropriately decided in a political, rather than a
judicial, forum." Id. at 631 (citing the transcript of Fla. C.R.C. proceedings 69-71 (Jan. 10,
1978)).
164. See Anderson, supra note 123, at 281-82. The author notes, "The danger inherent
in so limited a view of the first amendment is that it makes freedom of expression dependent on a judge's assessment of a statement's utility."
165. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 361 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
166. Certainly, the ad hoc determination of public matters is not more difficult than the
determination of who is a public figure. In Gertz, the court of appeals questioned the finding
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Professor Keeton has suggested the following formula when
dealing with intentional defamation:
(1) Evaluative opinions, unlike other defamatory statements are
not actionable.
(2) The plaintiff can establish a prima facie case of intentional
defamation by proving the following:
(a) that the defamatory statement about the plaintiff was false;
(b) that the defendant published the matter with knowledge of
its falsity, or without an honest belief in its truth, or without a
reasonable basis for believing its truth; and
(c) that actual harm to
the plaintiff's reputation occurred be167
cause of the publication.

This formula of recovery differs from the standard adopted in Ane
in several respects. First, rather than determining whether the reporter acted reasonably, the inquiry is whether the reporter had a
reasonable basis for believing his source.0 8 This query focuses on
the reporter's state of mind, thereby eliminating the inadequacy of
second-guessing the reasonableness of his editorial decisions. This
approach is consistent with the actual malice standard as well as
the express malice standard. Second, the formula requires proof of
actual harm to the plaintiff's reputation rather than a mere inference of humiliation or mental anguish. Professor Keeton's formula
thus provides adequate protection against jury -(in)discretion and
at the same time allows recovery for actual reputational damage.
2. Express Malice
A showing of express malice would make it more difficult for a
that Elmer Gertz was not a public figure. The court stated, "Plaintiff's considerable stature
as a lawyer, author, lecturer, and participant in matters of public import undermine the
validity of the assumption that he is not a 'public figure' as the term has been used by the
progeny of New York Times." 471 F.2d at 805. Cf. Steere v. Cupp, 602 P.2d 1267 (Kan.
1979) (Kansas Supreme Court held that a lawyer who represented a murder suspect was a
public figure); Buchanan v. Associated Press, 398 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1975) (an accountant for the committee to reelect the president was a public figure); Wolston v. Reader's
Digest As'n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979) (person failing to appear before a grand jury investigating
espionage not a public figure). Certainly, reporters and judges will have a difficult time making this determination. See Brief of Amicus Curiae, Apalachee Publishing Co., at 11, Ane,
458 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1984).
167. See Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX L. REv. 1221, 1235
(1976).
168. Perhaps an even better modification would be to substitute the word "rational" in
place of "reasonable." This would likely dissuade jurors from imposing their personal views
of what constitutes reasonable conduct in reporting.
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private citizen to recover in defamation actions. However, Florida's
common law has recognized that a heightened standard of liability
better serves the public's interest in the free flow of information."'
Although the supreme court considered the common law privilege
a lesser burden on the plaintiff than the actual malice standard,170
history reveals that the common law privilege afforded the media
stronger protection than the negligence standard adopted in
17 2
Ane.27 1 Recently, in Nodar v. Galbreath,
the Florida Supreme

Court adhered to the common law standard of "express malice" in
a defamation action brought by a private citizen against a
nonmedia defendant. Indeed, the supreme court mandated rigid
application of the express malice standard by announcing that
"[s]trong, angry, or intemperate words do not alone show express
malice; rather, there must be a showing that the speaker used his
privileged position to gratify his malevolence". 7
Further support for the adoption of the common law express
malice standard can be drawn from the United States Supreme
Court's refusal to mandate a negligence standard in Gertz. This
suggests that the Court believes defamation law, as developed by
the individual states, may better reconcile the competing interests
in ensuring a free press and protecting individual reputation.7
The Florida judiciary has demonstrated a strong commitment to
the principle of a free press, which has often predated parallel de169.

See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text

170. Ane, 458 So. 2d at 242. The supreme court reasoned that "under Florida common
law, the privilege was always defeated by express malice, a lesser standard than the actual
malice urged by petitioners." But see Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984) (very

difficult to overcome the burden to show express malice).
171. See generally Rahdert & Snyder, supra note 12 (authors present a comprehensive
analysis of Florida common law regarding defamation).
172.

462 So. 2d 803.

173. Id. at 811. The supreme court elaborated on what kind of language would constitute
a finding of express malice:
Examples of cases where the false and defamatory words themselves were so ex-

treme as to intrinsically show express malice are Loeb v. Geronemus, 66 So. 2d
241 (Fla. 1953) (defendant said plaintiff was guilty of evil conduct, was of low

moral character, was a disgrace, a troublemaker, was not respectable, had been
compelled to leave Chicago) and Brown v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 196 So. 2d
465 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967) (defendant said plaintiff was a murderer, rapist, and

sodomite).
Id. at 812.
This standard would seem to provide greater protection than that afforded under the actual
malice standard. Cf. Holter, 366 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); Cape Publications,336 So.

2d 1197 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976).
174.

See Rahdert & Snyder, supra note 28, at 30.
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velopments in the United States Supreme Court.17 5 Thus, express
malice, as defined in Florida's common law and applied recently in
Nodar, establishes an acceptable middle ground which accommodates the reputational interest of the private individual, and at the
same time assures that the press is free to publish matters of public concern. 176 The Florida Supreme Court should not have felt restricted to a negligence standard by the Gertz decision.
B.

Actual Injury

It is difficult to prove injury to reputation, since the plaintiff's
only injury may be to his self-perception, and not to the manner in
which others perceive him. Acknowledging this possibility, the
Court in Gertz did not mandate a showing of injury to reputation,
but allowed mental anguish and personal humiliation to constitute
recoverable injury.17 7 Justice Powell, writing for the majority, attacked the notion of presumed damages, stating that it "invites juries to punish unpopular opinion rather than to compensate individuals for injury sustained by the publication of a false fact. 17 8
Accordingly, the
holding in Gertz requires competent evidence of
"actual injury. '1' 1 As a practical matter, it is difficult to imagine
that injuries such as mental anguish and personal humiliation will
not be presumed or inferred by the jury.1 80 Professor Anderson has
observed that "[iun the absence of a demonstration of Times recklessness, Gertz should preclude recovery for emotional injuries un18 This reasoning
accompanied by injury to relational interests.""
follows from the Court's insistence that the states must not transcend their legitimate interests in compensating for actual injury
to reputation. 8 2 Professor Anderson further asserts that once
reputational injury is proved, the plaintiff may be compensated for
ancillary emotional injuries. He states that "[to] permit recovery
for emotional injuries when no actual injury to reputation exists
1 83
would subvert the 'actual loss' requirement.
175. See generally Note, supra note 46. The Note tracks the development of the qualified media privilege in decisions of the Florida Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court.
176. See Rahdert & Snyder, supra note 12, at 50.
177. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Anderson, supra note 133, at 472.

181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
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In accordance with this apprehension, Justice Brennan believes
that a prohibition against presumed damages alone would not defeat the self-censorship threat. He reasons that "the Court's broadranging examples of 'actual injury'... inevitably allow a jury bent
on punishing expression of unpopular views a formidable weapon
for doing so."'

Although Gertz requires that all awards be sup-

ported by competent evidence, its expansive definition of actual
injury will not prevent substantial and random awards.
Despite the criticism of actual injury under Gertz, the Florida
Supreme Court adhered to the notion that actual injury to reputation is unnecessary to support an award of damages. The supreme
court determined that personal humiliation and mental anguish
standing alone were enough to justify an award. 185 Ironically, Florida courts have traditionally required plaintiffs to meet strict standards before they have been permitted to recover damages for intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress.8 ' For
example, in Gmuer v. Garner 87 the court insisted that for an action to lie for emotional distress absent physical injury, the conduct of the defendant must be outrageous. The supreme court in
Ane may have inadvertently created a new standard of liability
which may find broader application in the body of tort law as a
whole. 88 Ultimately, the ability to recover for emotional distress
resulting from such an expansive definition will neither materially
reduce the risk of capricious jury verdicts nor deter a jury from
punishing a publisher of unpopular ideas.189
C. A Better Approach: Proposed Legislation
Justice Brennan has suggested that more suitable remedies
might be found for reviving the reputation of the defamed individ184. Gertz, 418 US. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan also noted that
tinkering with defamation damages does not reduce self-censorship damages.
185. Ane, 458 So. 2d at 242-43 & n.3 (citing Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 460).
186. Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1950). The court stated, "This Court is
committed to the rule, and we re-affirm it herein, that there can be no recovery for mental
pain and anguish unconnected with physical injury in an action arising out of the negligent
breach of a contract whereby simple negligence is involved." Id. at 189. Accord Slocum v.
Food Fair Stores of Fla., 100 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1958).
187. 426 So. 2d 972 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
188. The Miami Herald made an interesting characterization of the decision in the Ane
case. The Heraldbelieved that the supreme court created a new tort of "negligent infliction
of emotional distress as a result of a newspaper article." Petitioner's Motion for Rehearing
and Clarification at 2, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane, 458 So. 2d 239 (FIn. 1984).
189. See Taskett v. King Broadcasting Co., 546 P.2d 81, 103 (Colo. 1976).
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ual outside the realm of monetary damages. Hinting that legislation may be more appropriate, he asserted in Rosenbloom that,
"[i]f the States fear that private citizens will not be able to respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in
the direction of ensuring their ability to respond, rather than in
stifling public discussion of matters of public concern."19 0
Unfortunately, the Florida legislature's failure to define actual
injury has not eliminated the danger of large libel awards. Florida's
defamation statute states, in relevant part, that if an "article or
broadcast was published in good faith; that its falsity was due to
an honest mistake of the facts; that there were reasonable grounds
for believing that the statements in said article or broadcast were
true; . . . then the plaintiff in such case shall recover only actual
damages." 19 1
As a practical matter, this statute does nothing to lessen the liability of publishers or to discourage libel actions. Although the
statute represented a significant step in media protection when it
was first adopted in 1933,192 it has become superfluous in light of
the Supreme Court's mandate that the actual malice standard
must be satisfied as a condition to recovery of punitive damages.1 98
Indeed, by its terms, the statute appears to mandate application of
something less than a negligence standard to recover actual damages. Moreover, by deferring to the supreme court's broad definition of actual injury, the Florida legislature has in no way protected the media from punishment for controversial publications.
The legislature should revise the statute to include a brief
description of what constitutes actual damages. The statute should
require a showing of injury to reputation. Since the purpose of
such a statute is to minimize possible reputational injury to the
allegedly defamed individual, a required showing of reputational
injury is consistent with its objective. Additionally, by mandating a
showing of injury to reputation, two other desirable objectives are
furthered: (1) First amendment interests are better served because
the number of claims will be reduced; and (2) this approach is consistent with Florida case law which has restricted the circumstances that allow an individual to recover exclusively for an emotional injury.
The legislature could better resolve the inefficacy of the current
190.
191.
192.
193.

Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 47.
FLA. STAT. § 770.02 (1983).
Ch. 16-070, 1933 FIa. Laws 427.
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
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statute by adopting a statute similar to England's Defamation Act
of 1952.194 The Act allows the publisher to avoid liability by establishing reasonable care and publishing an apology or correction. 195
Constitutional restrictions currently preclude a mandatory right of
reply statute, 98 but a consensual reply statute has not been foreclosed. This approach is entirely consistent with tort law principles
that protect some individual interests, particularly relational interests, only from intentional invasion. Consequently, accidental invasions of privacy do not give rise to a cause of action. 19 7
There are three advantages to this approach. In order to avoid
litigation costs and a possible adverse judgment, the print and
electronic media will be more receptive to requests for replies from
those who believe they have been defamed. This comports with the
notion that the media should be a market place of ideas. Second,
since credibility is one of the most important attributes of a newspaper or news broadcast, the publisher will be encouraged to perform responsibly to ensure that corrections and apologies will not
take precious time and space, thereby avoiding unnecessary doubt
as to newspaper veracity. Third, the individual who feels he has
been defamed will have a mechanism by which he can attempt to
preserve his reputation, and recover for any injuries, provided he
can prove them.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although it is too early to determine its full effect, the Florida
Supreme Court's decision in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Ane
represents a retreat from the enthusiastic extension of media pro194. Defamation Act of 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, ch. 66.
195. See Aafco Heating & Air Conditioning Co. v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 321
N.E.2d 580, 587 (Ind.Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976).
196. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). A Florida statute
provided that if a newspaper attacked the character or official record of a candidate for
office, the newspaper must, upon request and without cost, permit the candidate to reply.
The Miami Herald refused a request from Pat Tornillo who was running for office. The trial
court held the law violative of the first amendment and refused to enforce it. The Florida
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling. The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Florida Supreme Court's decision. Chief Justice Burger opined, "A responsible press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by
the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated." Id. at 256. But see
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). The Supreme Court held that
maligned individuals deserve the right to reply and that the public has the right to hear
opposing views.
197. See, e.g., 1 F. HARPER & F. JAms, TImz LAw OF ToRs § 6.10 (1956); Green, Protection of Trade Regulations Under Tort Law, 47 VA.LR
1y.559, 560-61 (1961).
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tection that previously characterized Florida's common law. The
court's adoption of the simple negligence standard will likely increase the number of defamation actions and thus encourage media self-censorship.
The United States Supreme Court has all but conceded that the
competing interests of reputation and free expression cannot be
reconciled.198 Revealing its uncertainty, the Court in Gertz surrendered part of the task to the individual states. Due to the broad
language of the first amendment, confusion over common law principles of defamation, and compromises resulting from an ad hoc
approach, a network of subtle and confusing distinctions has developed which courts have applied inconsistently. In an area where
certainty and consistency are crucial, the decisions in Ane, Levin,
and Nodar send conflicting signals regarding the Florida Supreme
Court's position regarding freedom of speech and the press. Significant case law that is inconsistent with the decision in Ane and
Levin remains undisturbed. In its zeal to bridle the excesses of the
press, the supreme court failed to realize that such a restrictive
standard would not alter the behavior of reporters, but only serve
to force publishers to predict a jury's assessment of reasonableness.
The only safe alternative for the media is censorship of information that would have otherwise been reported to the public. This
totally contradicts the goal of opening all channels of communication and allowing the credibility of the information to stand or fall
on its own merits.
By rejecting the constitutional actual malice standard and the
common law express malice standard, the court has created illogical distinctions that inhibit free speech. Indeed, the court's own
treatment of express malice in Nodar would have been more consistent with the historical treatment of freedom of the press.
Further uncertainty is introduced by the court's broad definition
of actual injury, which can only encourage libel suits and force
publishers to steer far wider of the unlawful zone. This is exactly
the danger that both the United States Supreme Court and the
Florida Supreme Court have traditionally tried to avoid.
The legislature should return Florida's long-standing principle of
a free press, which can be accomplished only by the ability to disseminate the news in a quick and fearless manner. The objective of
198. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 281 ("Whatever is added to the field of libel is
taken from the field of free debate.") (quoting Sweeney v. Patterson, 128 F.2d 457, 458 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 678 (1942)).
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defamation actions is to compensate individuals whose reputations
have been injured. It logically follows that any statutory recovery
should be based on actual injury to reputation.
Through a consensual reply statute, the legislature can create a
condition precedent to instituting a libel action that, if honored,
will preclude any recovery other than actual injury to reputation.
If litigated, the express or actual malice standard should be applicable. The statute would also serve as a vehicle through which the
defamed individual, private or public, could respond and thereby
more efficiently protect against reputational injury. A legislative
directive of this kind will adequately readjust the delicate balance
between the law of defamation and the freedom of speech and
press.
M. David Shapiro

